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Can the individual actions of agents spontaneously move the system out of a state 
where it is locked in to an environmentally inferior technology, or is coordination 
from outside the system necessary in the form of public intervention? More 
importantly, even if the system were able to make the transition unaided, could 
market coordination mechanisms play an important role? The results of our model 
show that it would be advisable to undertake policies expressly  aimed at the 
process of sustainable technological change  –applying an  ex ante  (precautionary) 
approach– in a way that is complementary to the conventional  equilibrium 
oriented  environmental policies. The nature of these policies and how they might 
be implemented are questions we will a ddress from this novel approach to the 
concept of sustainable development. In short, the main objectives of this paper are 
to understand more fully the dynamics of the process of technological change, its 
role in sustainable development, and to assess the  implications of this dynamic 
approach to techno-environmental policy. To achieve these goals we have 
developed an agent based model (ABM), using distributed artificial intelligence 
(DAI) concepts drawn from the general methodology of social simulation. 
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The role of technological progress in sustainable development derives from the fact that the 
way in which energy and raw materials are transformed in the economy depends primarily on 
the state of technological k now-how (Mulder et al., 1999). This implies that the diffusion of 
technological innovations can change the material basis of the economic process. Thus, the 
technologies used can be perceived as being simultaneously both the cause and possible 
solution to  environmental problems (Gray, 1989). However, the literature has paid greater 
attention to the extent to which technological change can enable sustainable development to 
be achieved (Ausubel and Langford, 1997; Ausubel and Sladovich, 1989). 
 
The conflict b etween defenders of the weak and strong forms of sustainability to a large 
extent stems from the difference of opinion between the two camps as to the potential of 
technological change (Faucheux, 1997). Both viewpoints ascribe a crucial role to 
technological change in their concept of sustainability. However, neither perspective offers 
the basis for a detailed analysis of the  processes involved in technological change. The reason 
for this limitation is in the similarity of the concept of technological change underlying both 
approaches. Both schools reduce technological change to an aggregate, unidimensional level, 
by assuming an exogenously determined  rate of technological change. The value assigned to 
this rate is what, to some extent, differentiates the two schools. However, sustainable 
development is a dynamic  process, and as such, any description of it should include not only 
quantitative aspects, in terms of rates of technological progress, but also the  qualitative 
aspects of that change (Saviotti, 1996). When studying technological change it is necessary to 
take into account the multiple dimensions of today’s major techno-environmental issues, such 
as the depletion of the ozone layer, the loss of biodiversity, soil erosion and degeneration, 
water pollution, etc. These problems are characterized by their global nature, high degree of 
uncertainty, irreversibility and the high complexity of their consequences and probabilities of 
occurrence (Faucheux and Froger, 1995). The broadening spectrum of environmental 
problems, in conjunction with the uncertainty regarding their scale and duration, and their 
possible irreversibility, added to the growing social preference for environmental quality, 
make it necessary to undertake an  ex ante  (precautionary) approach to  the link between 
productive activity and environmental quality, namely technology. We firmly believe that the 
right approach to sustainable development involves understanding the  process of 
technological change that leads towards sustainability, and that t he way to achieve this 
understanding is to use an evolutionary approach, such as that incorporated in the model put 
forward in this paper
1. 
                                                   
1  The main differences between the conventional or neoclassical approach to the analysis of technological change and the 
evolutionary approach adopted here basically arise from the objections of evolutionary economists to the way in which the 
(aggregate) production function is used by neoclassical economists and their apparent inability to explain the processes of 
technological innovation (Nelson and Winter, 1974, 1977 and 1982; Dosi, 1982; Dosi  et al., 1988).  Thus, while the 
neoclassical approach portrays technological change as a simple change in the information available on the relationship 
between the economy’s  inputs and  outputs  (Stoneman, 1983; Gomulka, 1990), the evolutionary approach considers 
technological change to be the result of a self-referential process of evolution influenced by the prevailing economic, social 
and p olitical institutions.  According to this approach, technological development should be understood as a process of 
evolution in which alternative technologies compete with one another and with the dominant technology, with a subsequent 
selection determining the winners and losers, but considerable initial uncertainty about who these winners will be (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982). Given that uncertainty is intrinsic to the process of technological change, the assumption of rational 
maximizing behaviour is replaced by a search for profit “in the dark” (e.g. using heuristic search routines); as a result, there is 
no single welfare maximizing equilibrium, but rather a plurality of possible equilibria: historical accidents thus determine 
which equilibrium is reached or approached at any given time; the structure, including the institutions, is often made explicit 
in evolutionary models, so that its place in the process of technological change can be studied (Lipsey and Carlaw, 1998). IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




It seems self-evident that in order to achieve greater environmental quality without limiting 
productive activity, a n effort needs to be made to promote innovation in clean technologies2. 
In fact, environmental innovation has been recognized as being crucial to tackling the thorny 
issue of the timing of climate policy (Wigley et al., 1996; Schneider and Goulder, 1997). 
Nevertheless, there is a growing consensus on the potential for environmental improvement 
that could be achieved through the  diffusion of the clean technologies that already exist, in 
particular in terms of improved energy efficiency and the consequent reduction in the 
emissions associated with the use of fossil fuels (Bernow et al, 1998; Koomey et al., 1998; 
Krause, 1996; Lovins, 1991; Union of Concerned Scientists and Tellus Institute, 1998; 
Interlaboratory Working Group, 1997; Alliance to Save Energy, 1997). It is therefore worth 
asking what is holding back the diffusion of these existing technologies. The debate basically 
rests on the cost of transition to these new technologies. This is an issue which has been 
approached from two opposing perspectives:  aggregate economic models (a top-down 
approach) and engineering studies (a bottom-up approach)
3. According to various authors, 
both approaches rely on excessively simplistic assumptions about the  dynamic of energy 
substitution and the  process  of technological change (Kemp, 1997; Carraro and Galeotti, 
1997). In this paper we put forward a broader view of the  process of technological change 
which allows us to show how an important barrier to the diffusion of clean technologies arises 
from the fact that the economic system is locked in to technology standards (Arthur, 1989, 
1990, 1994; Cowan, 1990; David, 1985) which are potentially environmentally inferior. This 
lock-in is due to the existence of significant  increasing returns to adoption of energy 
technologies, produced by economies of scale, learning (Arrow, 1962a; Sheshinsky, 1967) 
and networks (Katz and Shapiro, 1985 and 1986; Farrell and Saloner, 1986a and b; 
Economides, 1996), arising out of the integrated and systemic nature of these technologies 
(Schilling, 1998: 269; Kemp, 1996: 161). Under these conditions, the same distribution of 
technologies and user preferences can lead to different structures in the breakdown of the user 
market, depending on how things start out (Economides, 1996: 26). The system  therefore has 
a multiplicity of equilibria which, when expressed in terms of market shares, can be 
interpreted as spontaneous or de facto standards (David and Greenstein, 1990). Spontaneous 
standards emerge as a result of internal market processes and not  as the result of a coordinated 
action by its participants. Early superiority, however, is no guarantee of long-term suitability 
(David, 1989; Cowan, 1990; Nelson, 1994a). Thus, in the presence of increasing returns, 
apparently inferior designs can become l ocked in to the production system  indefinitely in a 
historically dependent process in which circumstantial events determine the winning 
alternative (David, 1985, 1997). We would like to highlight the fact that the analysis of 
technological diffusion contained in the literature on the phenomenon of technological lock-in 
has devoted very little attention to issues concerning pre-existing alternatives or the 
conditions under which new technologies are able to displace old ones in a technological 
succession (Windrum and Birchenhall, 2000). As well as Arthur, many other authors have 
also portrayed the technology selection process as an “all or nothing” story (Abrahamson and 
Rosenkopf, 1997). This is a general shortcoming of the technology diffusion and 
                                                   
2 Clean technologies or environmentally sound technologies (ESTs) are defined in chapter 34 of Agenda 21 (United Nations, 
1992b) as those technologies that “(...) protect the environment, are less polluting, use all resources in a more sustainable 
manner, recycle more of their wastes and products, and handle residual wastes in a more acceptable manner than the 
technologies for which they were substitutes (...) Environmentally sound technologies are not just individual technologies, 
but total systems which include know-how, procedures, goods a nd services, and equipment as well as organizational and 
managerial procedures.” The minutes of the 2 nd Plenary Meeting under the  Kyoto Protocol (United Nations, 1997), requires 
that the Convention Secretariat “ (...) continue its work on the synthesis and dissemination of information on environmentally 
sound technologies and know-how conducive to mitigating and adapting to climate change” and the parties are urged to 
“create an enabling environment to help further stimulate private-sector investment in, and transfer of, environmentally sound 
technologies”. 
3 An overview of models representing each of these perspectives can be found in Böhringer (1998). IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




standardization models which has repeatedly been highlighted in various studies over the last 
decade (Schilling, 2002: 395; Jaffe et al., 2000: 41; Windrum and Birchenhall, 1998: 112; 
David, 1997: 36; Nelson, 1994b; David and Greenstein, 1990: 8). It seems clear that, rather 
than the deterministic view of conventional models of technology lock-in, it might be worth 
having an expanded formal view of the process of technology diffusion and standardization 
which bears in mind the possibility of a  technological succession
4, understood as a series of 
replacements of old technologies by new technologies performing the same basic function 
(Grübler, 1991). 
 
Various authors have flirted with the application of the concept of technology lock-in 
introduced by Arthur and his co-authors (Arthur, 1983, 1988, 1989; Arthur, Ermoliev and 
Kaniovski, 1987) in the environmental field (Kline, 2001; Mulder and Van den Bergh, 2001; 
Kallis, 2001; Jaffe et al., 2000; Van den Bergh and Gowdy, 2000; Peters et al, 1999; Kemp, 
1997; Goodstein, 1995; England, 1994; Kemp and Soete, 1992; Ayres, 1991). However, most 
of these studies have been undertaken at the level of what Nelson and Winter (1982) refer to 
as appreciative theory5.  Very few studies have formally applied the evolutionary concept of 
technological change to environmental policy and sustainability. Indeed, this is precisely one 
of the contributions this study aims to make. 
 
Conventional environmental policy is mainly based on economic and regulatory instruments 
that aim to control the negative impacts of production on the environment  ex post. In terms of 
technological change, these policies have mainly led to  incremental  changes in the established 
technologies, and to the development and use of “end-of-pipe” (EOP) technologies6. The 
results obtained may be acceptable in some cases, but in view of the progressive deterioration 
of the environment we are witnessing, they are clearly not sufficient.  The reorientation of the 
current economic system towards sustainability requires not only incremental improvements 
in existing technologies and systems, but more fundamental changes in the technology regime 
in those sectors with the greatest environmental impact (Mulder et al., 1999: 8; Freeman, 
1996: 37; Arentsen et al., 1999: 3). A number of authors admit that it is relatively unlikely 
that conventional environmental policy measures, not necessarily focused on technological 
change, may alone be able to bring about this  radical  change in technologies and practices 
(Kline, 2001: 97; Smith, 2000: 94;  Kuper and Van Soest, 1999; Mulder et al., 1999: 26; 
Kemp, 1996: 162; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1994: 546; Ayres, 1991: 265). This raises the 
following questions: can the individual actions of agents spontaneously move the system out 
of a state where it is locked in to an inferior technology or is coordination from outside the 
system necessary in the form of public intervention? More importantly, for the purposes of 
the hypothesis under examination here: even if the system were able to make the transition 
unaided, could market coordination mechanisms play an important role? The results of our 
                                                   
4  As will be seen below, our methodological approach to the problem being examined does not follow the few formal 
mathematical models that have attempted to tackle the process in which a technology is replaced by multiple alternatives 
(Peterka and Fleck, 1978; Marchetti and Nakicenovic, 1979) and, obviously, it also departs from binary models of technology 
replacement (Fisher and Pry, 1971). For this reason, in order to ensure a clearer and more direct exposition of our approach, 
we have not explained them at length. For more information on these models see, for example, Kwasnicky (1999b). 
5  Identification and  evaluation of the main facts that characterize an empirical phenomenon, so as to provide a broad 
conceptual base and theoretical elements necessary for subsequent formal models. 
6  A distinction is usually drawn between cleaning technologies, such as EOP and other technologies to treat environmental 
problems downstream from the production process and clean technologies, which are those being discussed here. Clean 
technologies involve identifying the environmental problem upstream of the production process and using clean product. 
Clean technology is preventive, whereas cleaning technology is only curative (Kemp, 1997: 12).  At present, most 
investments in pollution control equipment in industrialized countries (around 80%) is spent on EOP technologies (OIG, 
2000). IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




model show that it would be advisable to undertake policies expressly  aimed at the process of 
sustainable technological change  –applying an  ex ante  (precautionary) approach– in a way 
that is complementary to the conventional  equilibrium oriented  environmental policies. The 
nature of these policies and how they might be implemented are questions we will address 
from this novel approach to the concept of sustainable development. 
 
In short, the main objectives of this paper are to understand more fully the dynamics of the 
process of technological change, its role in sustainable development, and to assess the 
implications of this dynamic approach to techno-environmental policy.  To achieve these goals 
we have developed an agent based model7 (ABM), using distributed artificial intelligence 
(DAI) concepts drawn from the general methodology of social simulation. 
 
2. Techno-environmental policies 
The process of technological change is commonly described in terms of the so-called 
“Schumpeterian trilogy” of invention, innovation and diffusion (Schumpeter, 1942). 
However, technology policy in developed countries has traditionally tended to focus on the 
initial phases, invention and innovation, in the form of science and R&D (Limpese  et al., 
1992). Although it is generally recognized that the productive potential and competitiveness 
of technologies is achieved through the process of diffusion, policy initiatives have 
overlooked numerous opportunities to improve the process of technology diffusion (Hahn and 
Yu, 1999). Nevertheless, over the last decade there seems to have been a gradual reorientation 
of technology policy towards diffusion (Stoneman and Diederen, 1994). The subject we are 
dealing with here highlights the importance  –indeed the need– for this reorientation; at the 
same time, it seems to call for a new perspective in the justifications and focus of technology 
diffusion policy. 
 
The neoclassical approach to technology policy is built on Arrow’s (1962b) analysis of 
market failure.  According to this analysis, a completely competitive and decentralized market 
will provide a sub-optimal level of knowledge. This justifies public intervention either to 
create knowledge or to establish i ntellectual property rights. In neoclassical microeconomics a 
state with a welfare maximizing goal (under conditions of unbounded rationality) and perfect 
information on its environment and the consequences of its decisions, should be able to 
correct market failures efficiently and bring the economic system to a Pareto optimal 
equilibrium. The role assigned to the State is therefore corrective  in nature (Moreau, 1999: 5). 
The evolutionary approach to technological change suggests taking a broader view of 
technology policy than that put forward by the neoclassical approach. The fundamental 
difference lies in the fact that evolutionary economics departs from the assumption of a single 
stable equilibrium for the economic system. The existence of multiple alternative equilibria 
gives a new rationale to the State’s intervention in the economy, in that coordination
8  of the 
                                                   
7  Other commonly used names for this discipline include: Agent-Based Simulation, Agent-Based Computational Economics 
(ACE) or Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). 
8  Within Neo Keynesian economics a whole sub-field has grown up dedicated to coordination failures based on the work of 
Bryant (1983), Diamond (1982), Hart (1982) and Weitzman (1982). According to this literature, in numerous socio-economic 
situations coordination problems (failures) appear, which can arise from a situation in which there are multiple equilibria 
(Cooper and John, 1988; Ball and Romer, 1991).  These situations include the presence of increasing returns  (Weitzman, 
1982; Manning, 1990; Bohn and Gorton, 1993). These failures are the result of the inability of the agents to coordinate their 
actions successfully in a decentralized economy (Cooper and John, 1988: 442).  Coordination failure models generate 
outcomes that are inferior in terms of welfare, due to the fact that the agents have no incentive to change their behaviour and IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




decisions by individual agents may be necessary in order to seek convergence between the 
particular and general interests (Moreau, 1997: 6). In  the evolutionary approach the main 
question is not optimization and equilibrium, but endogenous change, evolution and economic 
development (Llerena and Matt, 1999: 4). The focus of attention has ceased to be on the 
market failure  per se and has moved to the improvement in competitive performance and the 
promotion of structural change (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989). Thus, the role assigned to the 
State ceases to be corrective and becomes  adaptive, insofar as it is more concerned with 
influencing the process than imposing a particular result (Metcalfe, 1995: 31). 
 
The model put forward here eschews the irrevocable determinism of conventional technology 
lock-in models and shows how endogenous changes in industry, on both the technology 
supply and demand sides, allow transitions between equilibria to arise within the system 
itself, without the need for public intervention. However, the timing of this spontaneous 
transition may fail to be the socially most appropriate (David and Greenstein, 1990: 12). From 
this view point, our main justification for public intervention in the process of technology 
diffusion where there are increasing returns to adoption, which may result in a succession of 
socially sub-optimal technology standards, lies in the greater ability of the  State to  coordinate 
technology choices (Metcalfe, 1995: 31) and achieve a socially superior timing. In order to 
pursue this goal, the State should cautiously take on what David and Greenstein (1990: 12) 
and Moreau (1999: 8) call a  pilot role as the coordinator of a market process, guiding it 
through multiple point attractors. On this view, a State with bounded rationality and imperfect 
information about the respective social merits of the various attractors discovers and learns 
the characteristics of the competing products (technologies) as it goes along. This learning 
process takes place  simultaneously  with the process of competition. According to the 
approach proposed by Moreau, a timely intervention is enough to create a sufficient stimulus 
to guide the system towards the (socially) desired attractor, as once a given user base has been 
acquired, cumulative endogenous phenomena come into play (economies of scale and 
learning) and can replace the exogenous public intervention. According to Moreau, when the 
existence of multiple point attractors is considered, public intervention becomes “richer” in 
the evolutionary perspective than the neoclassical. The State does not have to limit itself to 
correcting market failures, but can guide and fine tune the economic system. 
 
From the arguments above, which will be considered in the model proposed below, it may be 
deduced that faced with the possibility and/or fact of a situation of sub-optimal technology 
lock-in, the technology diffusion policy should (and can) go beyond establishing ad hoc 
economic incentives to consider new types of instruments  –markedly evolutionary in nature– 
which we have defined as  techno-environmental  prevention policies and  techno-
environmental  transition policies. 
 
2.1. Techno-environmental prevention policy 
The essence of this precautionary approach in the environmental field derives from Principle 
15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (United Nations, 1992), which 
states that: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
                                                                                                                                                             
reach a more  preferred state of welfare (Allen and Stone, 2001). If the coordination problems reflect the inability of the 
agents to select the Pareto optimal equilibrium, then the State can take steps to achieve the desired outcome by eliminating 
some undesirable equilibria as it converts the strategies that support them into dominated strategies (Cooper, 1999: 126). IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.” Thus when there is a real possibility of a sub-optimal technology 
lock-in, a “technology prevention” policy needs to be considered. Obviously, there is no 
generally applicable algorithm allowing policy-makers to identify in advance with absolute 
certainty what technologies are environmentally superior (Kline, 2001). Rather, our view 
lends support to the  role of policy-makers who act as a coordinator of the market process 
through the multiple point attractors, with bounded rationality and imperfect information 
about their respective environmental merits, who discover and learn the characteristics and 
risks of the competing technologies as they go. It is important to note that this learning 
process takes place  simultaneously with the competition process, so it could be considered 
vigilance rather than prediction. We believe that in practice policy-makers have a series of 
precautionary tools that, from the perspective of technological change, can complement 
traditional environmental policy instruments as a means of achieving sustainable 
development. The results of this research support the greater development  and use of such 
tools, which include: 
 
–  Environmental Technology Assessment (EnTA), which focuses on the preliminary 
assessment and evaluation of the environmental consequences of specific technology 
options. This is a qualitative multidisciplinary tool t hat is based on dialogue. Its aim is to 
aid the selection of the most sustainable technology option at the start of its development. 
EnTA can be a win-win process for governments, users and other social agents, as well as 
for the environment (UNEP, 2000). 
–  Pollution Prevention Strategies (PPS) force a broadening of view, inquiring what 
alternatives can reduce emissions  ex ante rather than what alternatives can mitigate 
emissions  ex post. This therefore constitutes a way of evaluating options independently  of 
the dominant solution (Sinsheimer et al., 2002; EPA, 1996; Becker and Ashford, 1995). 
–  Other tools, which are perhaps more technical than political in scope, and which although 
they are not focused strictly on technological choice, nevertheless share t his preventive 
feature, include: Environmental Impact Assessment, Environmental Risk Assessment and 
Life Cycle Assessment. 
 
2.2. Techno-environmental transition policy 
In a case of existing sub-optimal environmental technology lock-in, a policy of “technology 
transition” is required, which builds on the cumulative, feedback character of technological 
change. Once again the policymaker adopts the role of a guide for the market, highlighting 
and creating incentives for the socially desirably technology option until, once a given user 
base has been achieved  –which would have been difficult to reach without an intervention, 
due to the lock-in of the dominant technology– cumulative endogenous phenomena come into 
play (economies of scale and learning) and are able to replace the exogenous public 
intervention. The tools available in policy-making practice  –the greater use of which is 
supported by the findings of this study– include the following in particular: 
 
–  Strategic Niche Management (SNM), which is a process  oriented towards modulating the 
dynamics of socio-technological change by creating and managing spaces in which a new 
technology can be used (Weber et al., 1999; Schot et al., 1994; Rip, 1992). Through this 
limited temporary protection SNM aims to create a  space that is protected from the 
selective pressures of the market. This strategy is particularly useful in the case of “clean” IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




technologies, in which the social benefits are undervalued by the market, and systemic 
technologies, such as energy technologies. 
–  Market Transformation Programmes (MTPs). These have the policy objective of creating 
incentives or inducing social, technological and economic change in a way that leads 
towards greater energy efficiency (Almeida et al., 2003; Blumstein et al., 2000). The main 
question is how market agents can apply guided actions to enable, facilitate or accelerate 
the diffusion of technological innovations, and thus bring about environmental benefits 
(Weber et al., 2002: 288). 
–  Demand Side Management (DSM) concentrates on stimulating demand and promoting the 
early commercialization of clean energy technologies which show substantial learning-by-
doing potential (Levine and Sonnenblick, 1994). 
–  Environmental Voluntary Agreements (EVA) are cooperation agreements between 
industries and/or firms and the agencies responsible for environmental regulation. Under 
such agreements the industry undertakes to carry out a series of actions voluntarily 
reducing the impact of its activity on the environment and/or facilitating its p rogressive 
compliance with the environmental legislation in force (EEA, 1999). This may constitute a 
relatively effective instrument with which to stimulate technological innovation, compared 
with other instruments such as taxes, standards or trading permits (Menanteau, 2002; 
Carraro and Leveque, 1999). Delmas and Terlaak (2001a, b and c) offer numerous 
examples of EVA being applied successfully in the international business community. 
  
3. An Evolutionary Model of Sustainable Technological Change 
In the last few years simulation has become a popular means of discovering and exploring 
complex natural and social systems (Hannerman and Patrick, 1997). The recognition that 
social and economic phenomena frequently exhibit characteristics typical of complex systems 
–significant non-linearity among them– is a challenge to traditional research methods 
(Holland, 1998; Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Latané, 1996; Gilbert, 1995). Thus, simulation has 
been put forward as a new way of conducting research, a “third scientific  discipline” (Ilgen 
and Hulin, 2000; Axelrod, 1997) that complements and is built on the traditional methods of 
induction and deduction. An important branch of simulation in the social sciences is agent 
based modelling (ABM), which is a form of modelling characterized by a number of 
autonomous agents which interact with one another and with their environment, with little or 
no central coordination (Conte et al., 1997; Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Gilbert and Troitzsch, 
1999; Weiss, 1999). Thus, the emergent properties of an ABM (i.e. the system’s macro-
behaviour) are the results of bottom-up processes (arising from micro-level interactions 
between agents in the system) rather than of top-down processes. According to Wooldridge 
and Jennins (1995), in an ABM the a gents are computational processes that are characterized 
by: i. their autonomy, in that they control their own actions; ii. social abilities, i.e. the agents 
interact with one another by means of some kind of “language”; iii. reactivity, in that the 
agents can perceive their environment and respond to it; and iv. proactivity, in that they are 
able to carry out actions in order to achieve an objective. Clearly, to a large extent, agents in 
the business world exhibit these characteristics, a fact making ABM s eem an appropriate 
methodology for studying emergent phenomena in markets. It should be highlighted that 
although ABM uses simulation its goal is not necessarily to represent a specific empirical 
application precisely, but rather to give us a more detailed understanding of the fundamental 
processes that may emerge in various applications. If this is the aim, what is important is the 
simplicity of the assumptions and not a detailed representation of a particular reality (Axelrod, 
1997). IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 





Building on the ABM  research methodology, this section describes the model put forward to 
achieve the aims and compare the hypotheses of the investigation. Its calibration, verification 
and validation are also discussed. 
 
3.1. Assumptions of the model 
We assume an indefinite  time horizon of  t  periods in which time evolves discretely ( t ˛¥) 
and the dynamic is asynchronous. We assume a single good or service  X , which may be 
produced using multiple alternative technologies  ( ) 1,...,,..., jt TjJJ = , the characteristics of 
which are defined below. In each period t the free entry of one or more new individual 
producers  ( ) 1,...,,..., it PiII =
9 of  X  takes place in a Poisson-type
10 random process with an 
average rate of appearance of new p roducers in a given period  0 P l > , which for simplicity 
we assume to be constant over time. Thus the probability that  t I  new producers emerge in the 
period t will be given by the probability function 
 












=    1,2, t II = K         [1]  
Each  i P  has an intrinsic survival parameter  i s  associated with it ( 0 > ). For simplicity this 
parameter is assumed to remain constant over time. In this simulation it is distributed 
independently at random between the different  i P in a way that follows a normal distribution 
( ) , s Ns s . Thus, in each  t  there is also the  free exit of producers whose survival period has 
expired, with the rest remaining in the following period as old producers.  
 
We assume that in each period  t one or more new alternative technologies appear on the 
market  ( ) 1,...,,..., jt TjJJ =  in a way that cannot be anticipated by the agents producing the 
good  X . These process innovations are provided by multiple technology suppliers
11, who act 
motivated by the pursuit of a patent which grants them a certain degree of monopoly power, 
                                                   
9 Assuming a finite number of agents in the industry responds to one of the criticisms of Arthur’s model, such as that raised 
by Dalle (1995) who questions the validity of “(...) assuming the existence of an infinite number of agents, as unanimity is 
not found except at the limit, making the time and therefore the number of agents tend to infinity. It seems to us that 
economic systems are constructed rather of a finite number of agents, who comprise a network and make use of local 
channels of information to enable them to make their decisions.” 
10  The assumption of a Poisson distribution is realistic and is well established in the literature for situations in which 
numerous successive events (in this case, the entry of firms in the sector) have independent sources (Mayer and Chappell, 
1992: 772; Loch and Hubberman, 1999: 6) 
11  According to Kemp (1997: 221) process innovations are generally developed by specialist suppliers, research institutions 
other than the producer firms, whereas product innovations are usually developed by the firms themselves. The model 
presented here deals with the diffusion of the first of these types of innovation: new technologies which substantially modify 
production processes. IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




albeit temporarily. We will suppose that these technologies arise following a Poisson-type
12 
random process, with  0 T l >  constant over time13. 
 












=   1,2, t JJ = K         [2] 
It is assumed that any technology  j T  which has not been adopted at any time  t by at least 
( ) 0 T P >  producers  –in accordance with the mechanisms described below– after  ( ) 0 T t >  
periods have passed, is considered to have been “rejected” by the productive system and as of 
that point in time is no longer available.
14 We also assume that each  j T  can be characterized 
according t o a set of criteria or characteristics 
j
k C  which allow their performance
15 to be 
measured from  K  different dimensions. Following Rogers (1995)
16, we propose the 
following technology characterization, adding one additional of criterion of social choice to 
his 5 individual adoptability criteria  ( 6 K = ),  although the number of criteria and their 
definition does not affect the main results of this model, the multi-dimensionality of the 










                                                   
12 As done, for example, by Silverberg and Lehnert (1993), (1994). 
13 In this way the model overcomes another of the habitual criticisms of Arthur’s model: “(...) a poorly convincing hypothesis 
is usually adopted  in technological competition models.  In Arthur’s model, for instance, competing technologies appear 
simultaneously on a virgin market. It seems much more realistic to consider a new technology entering a market held by one 
or several well-established technologies” (Moreau, 1999: 8). 
14 “Those technologies that are not pre-selected or fail to be accommodated in the system (...) are bound to fail and will not 
survive”  (Arentsen  et al., 1999: 9).  This assumption could easily be relaxed if we accept that the new technologies that 
emerge in each period are “improved versions” of technologies which have been rejected by the market. This could give rise 
to the introduction into the model of the issue of learning by doing and learning by using in R&D (Jaffe et al., 2000: 44) and 
the “quality ladders” models (Sala-i-Martin, 1994: 113). 
15  According to David and Greenstein (1990:  30), performance-oriented specifications are generally preferable to design-
oriented specifications, especially in the development of anticipatory standards. 
16 Following the main reference in the literature on this topic, Rogers (1995: 206), the attributes of an innovation perceived 
by its potential users explain to a large extent the rate of adoption of that innovation. According to this author, between 49 
and 87 per cent of the variation in the adoption rate is explained by just five attributes: the relative advantage is the extent to 
which an innovation is perceived as being better than the idea that preceded it (the perception of the relative advantage of an 
innovation is positively related to its adoption rate); the  compatibility is the extent to which an innovation is perceived as 
being consistent with existing values, past experience and the needs of potential adopters (this perception is positively related 
to the rate of adoption); the  complexity is the extent to which an innovation is perceived as being relatively difficult to 
understand and use (this perception is negatively related to the adoption rate); the trialability is the extent to which an 
innovation can be tried on a limited basis (a perception that is positively related to the adoption rate); the observability is the 
extent to which the results of an innovation are visible to others (positively related to the adoption rate). 
17 The traditional approach to the decision to invest in a technology (adoption) has focused on the evaluation by the adopter 
of a single criterion, usually the expected return on investment. However, it is widely accepted that the performance of a 
technology i s a multi-dimensional construct (Anderson and Tushman, 1990:  627; Foray and Grübler, 1990; Suárez and 
Utterback, 1995: 418; Rogers, 1995: 206; Kemp, 1997: 88; Christensen, 1997; Windrum and Birchenhall, 1998: 114; Nelson, 
2000: 70; Cantner and Hanusch, 2001: 229). Therefore, it would seem to be reasonable to asume that business people make 
their technology adoption decisions bearing in mind multiple dimensions or attributes of a technology, evaluating their (albeit 
imperfect) perceptions of them according to their (heterogeneous) preferences regarding each dimension or attribute. IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




Ak C : Adoptability criteria 
1 A C  – Relative advantage 
2 A C  – Compatibility 
3 A C  – Complexity 
4 A C  – Trialability 
5 A C  – Observability 
Sk C : Social choice criterion  
6 S C  – Sustainability 
 
Thus, each  j T  can be characterized by a performance vector 
 




                             [3] 
with elements  [ ] 0,1 k C ˛ , where the values 0 and 1 represent the extremes of a “bad” or 
“good” evaluation of its performance, respectively, within this continuous range. In this way 
the proposed classification system allows a  virtually unlimited number of alternative 
technologies  j T  for the production of the good  X  to be characterized. Obviously, in reality 
this would be beyond the cognitive limits, and indeed the physical limits, of technological 
development
18. However, it demonstrates the flexibility of the proposed model compared with 
those
19 that centre their analysis on only two alternative technologies. In the simulation we 
also establish that, due to the presence of increasing returns to adoption (deriving from 
learning by doing and learning by using, network effects, economies of scale, increasing 
returns to information and technology interrelations) the real value of each  k C  ( actual 
performance)  for each  j T  evolves as a function of the degree of adoption by  i P  producers 
(installed user base).  Where 
j
kt C  is the value of the actual performance of  j T  in  k C  in  t . As, 
in fact, the five individual selection criteria proposed are met, in the proposed range of values 
(range [0-bad,1-good]), we assume that 
j
Ikt C  is an increasing function of the number of agents 
i P  that adopt the technology  j T  in each t, 
jj















￿￿ Øø +-￿ ￿￿ Œœ ºß Łł
`￿
`￿
      [4] 
 
                                                   
18  Although Kemp (1996:  158) states optimistically that the number of technology options for improvement of climate 
change is almost infinite. 
19 See, for example, Arthur (1983, 1988, 1989); Laffond et al. (1999); Farrell and Saloner (1986); Shy (1996); Cowan (1988). IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




This is an increasing logistic function
20 (Figure 1) with an upper asymptote at the maximum 
level of performance 
j
Ak C `￿  or “frontier of improvement” which cannot be exceeded by each 
criterion of a technology, despite the accumulation of new adopters. 
0
j
Ak C  represents the 
starting level of performance ( 0
j
t I = ) of  j T  in 
j




Ak Ak CC > `￿  is always 
fulfilled, both variables being distributed randomly and independently between the different 
technologies arising in the same period  t following a  ( ) 0,1 N  within a range of possible 





 is set for 
0
j












Fig. 1. Function showing the evolution of the performance of a technology as its adoption grows 
 
The variable  ( ) 0 j r > represents the rate at which  j T  improves as a result of the presence of 
increasing returns to adoption
22. For simplicity, we will assume that the value of this rate of 
improvement  j r  is common to all the criteria of a given technology, although it is probable 
that in reality some technologies will improve more rapidly than others as the number of users 
increases. However, the model does incorporate the fact that the various alternative 
technologies will enjoy different degrees of increasing returns to adoption. Thus, in the 
                                                   
20 A ccording to Foster (1986:  96), an S -shaped curve shows precisely how the performance of a technology improves in 
comparison with the effort used to develop it. In practice, much of this development is the result of economies of learning, 
which in turn depend on the level of adoption and the experience of users. Many authors use similar functions: Loch and 
Huberman (1999: 12); Windrum and Birchenhall (2000: 12); Frenken and Verbart (1998). 
21 According to Kemp (1997: 273), “Many historical studies show that, at the time of their introduction, new technologies 
were often ill-developed in terms of performance characteristics and offered only few advantages over existing technologies. 
They needed to be improved, in terms of both prices and technical characteristics, in order to be diffused more widely.” 
According to Rosenberg and Frischtak (1983:  147), new inventions are typically very primitive at the time of their 
emergence. Their performance is generally poor compared with the (alternative) technologies that exist and with their future 
performance. 
22 It should be highlighted that despite the fact that the increasing returns are different (deriving from learning by using and 
learning by doing, economies of scale, increasing returns to information and technological interrelations), they are usually 
handled together mathematically (Nelson, 1995: 74; David and Greenstein, 1990: 6; Cabral, 1987; Metcalfe, 1994: 937) 
Performance (
j
Akt C )  
Adoption (
j
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simulation  ( ) 0 j r > 23 is distributed randomly and independently between the various different 
j T  emerging in the same  t  following an  ( ) , r Nr s . With regards to 
j
S C , we assume its 
evolution randomly increases or decreases with respect to the number of each technology 
users 
j
t I , incorporating the uncertainty and complexity which surround techno-environmental 
links into the model
24. Thus  j r  in  expression [4] for 
j
S C  will take the same value as in the rest 
of characteristics of  j T , but with a positive or negative value according to a Bernoulli 
distribution of probability a  between the different technologies arising in the same period.  
We assume the information in this technology market to be imperfect, such that each potential 




Akt C  is the perceived value of the performance of technology 
j T  by agent  i P  according to the criterion  Ak C  at time  t . In the simulation we assume that 
ij
Akt C  is distributed between the different agents, within the range of possible values  [ ] 0,1 , 
according to a normal distribution26 with its average at the actual value 
j
Akt C  and a standard 
deviation of 
j
Akt s :  ( ) ,
ijjj
AktAktAkt CNC s : , where 
j
Akt s  is a decreasing function of the number of 
agents adopting technology  j T  at a given moment t, 
jj












          [5] 
The parameter  0 c>  represents the rate of communication between users. The function 
( )
j
t gI   incorporates in the model the fact that as the number of users increases, so the 
uncertainty and information search costs decrease, and agents’ knowledge27 of the actual 
performance of a technology, and their expectations of it increase28.  This characterization of 
the process of diffusion of knowledge, which depends on the number of users
29, acts as a self-
                                                   
23 Also, in the simulation, a value of  0 r < , for all  j T , would allow us to represent a situation characterized by decreasing 
returns to adoption, whereas with  0 r =  (and  0 r s = ), for all  j T , we would be in a situation of constant returns to adoption. 
24 “New technologies may be able to solve some problems, but they may also introduce new ones” (Kemp et al., 1998: 180). 
“Climate change researchers are regularly confronted with new surprises” (Janssen y de Vries, 1998: 62). 
25 Rogers (1995: 206) argues that the perceived attributes of an innovation, as seen by its potential users, to a large extent 
explain the rate of adoption of the innovation. Frenken and Verbart (1998) point out that the return on the adoption of a 
technology probably depends on its perceived utility when a certain task is performed or a particular problem solved. 
26 Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1993). 
27 We argued above that as the number of people adopting a given technology grows, so the uncertainty is reduced and both 
the users and producers perceive reduced risk.  Their confidence in the quality and performance of the technology and 
perception of its likelihood of continuing to be available in the future therefore increases (Arthur, 1991). At the same time, 
the increase in the number of users reduces information search costs (Blackman, 1999). 
28  Before deciding whether or not to adopt a technology alternative, the potential users have limited and imperfect 
information about its actual performance. It is a generally accepted fact that agents’ expectations regarding the diffusion of a 
technology affect their decision to acquire it or invest in it (Katz and Shapiro, 1985: 426; Farrell and Saloner, 1986: 941; 
David and Greenstein, S., 1990: 7; Loch and  Huberman, 1999; Mulder et al., 1999: 9). Despite this consensus, most models 
of technological change use the change in actual performance of the technologies in question as a fundamental axis of their 
dynamic (unless they consider it constant).  The model p roposed here takes an alternative and more realistic approach by 
focusing on the changing  perceptions potential users have of the real performance of the technological alternatives.  As 
happens in the real world, in the model these perceptions of a technology improve with market experience, and come closer 
to the actual performance as the number of users grows. 
29  Responding to Dalle’s (1995) criticism of Arthur’s model, the model suggested here does not require that the potential 
adopter know the  exact number of users of each technology, but rather it incorporates the advantage of the technology with IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




reinforcing factor in the interest of agents  i P  in  the technology  j T , whose actual performance 
benefits from the number of users 
j
t I   itself, is an accurate representation of the bandwagon 
effect defined earlier. 
 
In random time intervals, following a stochastic process of replacement of obsolete 
technologies
30, each of the (new and old) producers  i P  active in the market in period  t  
decides individually. This means that, as will be discussed below, each producer can either 
decide to continue with the last technology he decided to install or adopt a new one from the 
j T  available in the period concerned.  For this purpose, in the simulation each active agent  i P 
at each time  ( ) 0 t >  is assigned a replacement parameter 
i
t rp  which takes a value of 1 
(replacement) or 0 (continuation) according to a Bernoulli probability distribution  b  within 
the group of agents active in that same period. The greater or lesser magnitude of the 
parameter  b  allows the model to represent industries with a greater or lesser tendency to 
technological obsolescence and/or industries in which technological change involves higher 
or lower costs. 
 
We assume that agents  i P  are not aware o f the aggregate environmental output of their 
individual decisions, that is to say, they do not take  Sk C   into account   in their technological 
choices
31. We measure the ecological impact of technological choices by means of a function 
of environmental damage  [ ] 0,1 t DA ˛ , 0 and 1 being the extremes of a minimum and 














       [6] 
In this way, we a re saying that, environmental damage resulting from business activity at each 
t, is symmetrically proportional to the average performance of the technological system in 
terms of sustainability. Let  DA `ˆˆ￿  be t he maximum damage or waste assimilation and natural 
resources regeneration capability of the ecosystem affected by business activity, over which 
environmental damage become irreversible if their source remains active for more than  ￿
DA t . 
Finally, we define the accumulated environmental damage at time t as  t t DA ￿ . 
 
We assume the presence of a collective decider (from now on the “Agency”) which represents 
the interests of both companies and  the rest of society. Apart from taking into account the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the greater number of users by means of a function reflecting its better actual performance [4] and a function incorporating 
the lesser uncertainty [5] surrounding this performance in the performance perceived by the producers. 
30 David and Greenstein, 1990: 6. 
31 In this respect, several studies show that, apart from being unaware of the ecological damage resulting from their business 
activities, firms often do not know which cleaner technologies are available (Kemp, 1997: 224). According to Kemp and 
Soete (1992: 450), “Although companies might increasingly feel responsible for the damage caused to environment, cleaner 
production does not represent an objective per  se within companies. As a consequence, the decision to adopt these 
technologies depends heavily on government regulation”.  IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




performance of technologies relevant to individual choice
32, the Agency looks after 
technologies sustainability33. In this sense, we assume that the Agency is aware that there are 
increasing returns to  adoption and is conscious of its accumulative consequences in individual 
adoptability criteria. The Agency counts on the above when it comes to direct market 
evolution through prevention and transition policies, as have been previously described. 
Moreover, it is able to assess the aggregate (social) consequences of individual decisions. 
Nevertheless, under the imperfect information assumption, this assessment is possible only 
during the course of events, and not prior to them. This is due to the uncertainty and 
complexity of socio-techno-ecological links. We assume furthermore that, aware of its 
bounded rationality to cope with the complexity of the problem, the Agency aims at satisfying 
its objectives and not optimising its decisions.
34  The Agency can influence individual 
decisions, trying to guide the market through a competition process (transition policy). We 
represent this influence by means of a dynamic and generic
35 support  [ ] 0,1
j
t D˛  which can be 
assigned by the Agency, to a most preferred technology  j T  as shown below. In the 
simulation, starting from a tentative 
0
j D , intensity of the support increases or decreases 
exponentially over time  ( 0 t > ) at a rate  [ ] 0,1 t ˛ , depending on current environmental 
damage level ( t DA ); on the intensity of the support the last time that damage evolution 
changed its course (
j
c D ) and depending on time elapsed since that c hange took place ( c tt - ). 
We can thereby state that the Agency “learns” and acts according the following decision 













    then  ( ) c tt jj
tc e
t -- D=D￿     [7] 















t -- D=--D￿   [8] 
















DA t`ˆˆˆ￿  the time elapsed since  t DADA > `ˆˆ￿ . 
 
                                                   
32 “Policy should take such aspects into consideration [performance characteristics] in designing environmental policies in 
order  to prevent cost inefficiencies, obstruction from industry and non-compliance” (Kemp, 1997: 240). 
33 “It is also important that policy makers take into account the technological opportunities to develop substitutes for 
environmentally hazardous technologies, together with firms´ capabilities and willigness to use them” (op. cit.: 241). 
34 All these assumptions have been sufficiently justified before. 
35 This support 
j
t D  does not necessarily intend to represent an economic subsidy, but all those signs (information, formation, 
demonstration, voluntary agreements, etc.) which show the official interest with regard to a certain technology to industry: 
“(...) Knowing that the government is giving priority to a particular externality (…) makes it more rational for a firm to adopt 
environmental protection measures than if it were acting alone” (DeCanio, 1993: 912). IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




An agent can be considered to have bounded rationality regarding various aspects of the 
problem, such as his ability to calculate or access to all the information he needs to make a 
decision.  In this model it is possible to argue t hat despite his imperfect information, the 
individual agent may  try to optimize the problem of individual choice. In other words, we 
assume that each  Pi has bounded rationality in terms of access to information, but that given 
the decision scale he acts  as if he were optimizing his private decisions
36. Let us also suppose 
that  i P  agents have heterogeneous preferences regarding the adoption characteristics 
j
Ak C  of 
the productive technologies. Thus, in each  t , each  i P adopts
37 the  j T  that offers the greatest 
value in terms of the linear decision
38 function  ( ) 0
i




tt UwCwCwCwCwCw D =￿+￿+￿+￿+￿+￿D      [10] 
where the parameters  ( ) 01
ii ww <<  are the weightings the agent  i P  attributes to the various 
criteria involved in his decision. In the simulation we assume that for each  i P the weightings 
are normalized, i.e. the condition  1
i w = ￿  is met; additionally, we assume that the values of 
each of the weightings 
i w  that each  i P attributes to each criterion is distributed independently 
and randomly between the different producers  i P following a  ( ) 0,1 N  distribution within the 
range of possible v alues  [ ] 0,1 . In this way, apart from contemplating the assumption of 
heterogeneous preferences of agents with regard to adoptability criteria, we reflect the fact 
that different agents react unevenly to a same public stimulus.  We assume that the value of 
these weightings, which constitute the preference profile of  each agent  i P , do not change over 
the course of the agent’s active life. Nevertheless, the average weightings assigned by the 
group of active agents in each  t  do change, given that the group changes (quantitatively and 
qualitatively) as agents enter and leave the market.  
 
Through a participative process
39 which considers the preferences of all relevant stakeholders, 
the Agency sets, both initially ( 0 t = ) and subsequently in each period (as shown below), a 
satisfaction threshold40 
*
St C  with regard to the social choice criteria valued in a technology 
that is compatible with its collective aims of sustainability. In the simulation, 
*
St C  value is set 
arbitrarily at  0 t =
41 within this range [ ] 0,1 .  
 
                                                   
36 According to Nelson (1995: 50), “there is no real difference between saying that companies literally maximize and saying 
that their behaviour has been learned through trial and error, and in some cases they have been selected by the competitive 
process. In this way, agents act ‘as if’ they were maximizing.” Using this approximation, for example, Loch and Huberman 
(1999: 5) assume that “(...) agents are governed by profits but are unable to optimize due to their bounded rationality. [On 
this assumption] agents simply choose the ‘best’ of the technologies available, without being able to conduct a full evaluation 
or anticipate the equilibrium of the system.” 
37  In other words, each agent adheres to a “technology population” in Saviotti’s sense (2001:  200), which evolves in 
quantitative terms (size) and qualitative terms (composition). 
38 We apply a simple method of weighted (linear) summation (see, for example, Pomerol and Barba-Romero, 2000: 76). 
39For a practical approach see, for example, Linares and Romero (2002) or Feinberg and Smith (1989). 
40 See Pomerol and Barba-Romero (2000: 71). IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




Each term  t the Agency valuates each available, old and new
42 technology performance in 
terms of sustainability St C  (techno-environmental prevention policy). It therefore takes the 
satisfaction threshold 
*
St C   and the first technology in  t  in order of availability 
1 T  and 
compares 
*
St C  to the corresponding value of 
1






St C  were below threshold 
*
St C , then 
technology 
1 T  would be valued in the next period (if it is still available and within sight of its 
evolution); the following technology in order of availability 
2 T  would be compared to the 
threshold. If 
1
St C  were equal or higher than 
*
St C , 
1 T  would remain until performance valuation 
of the following technology 
2 T . This process would last until all
50 technologies available in  t  
had been evaluated. If no available technology in  t exceeded the satisfaction threshold, this 
would remain invariable in next period  1 t+  and the Agency would keep supporting the last 
chosen technology 
* j
t T . If only one technology rose above the threshold, it, rather than the 
other alternatives, would receive the Agency´s support 
j
t D . If more than one technology 
remained, the one whose performance in criterion  S C  strictly dominated the remainder would 
be chosen and supported with 
j
t D , and these technologies would valued in the next period (if they 
are still available and within sight of their evolution)
43. 
 
Each time  t, the performance of  S C  of chosen and supported technology 
* j
t T , plus an 
improvement differential  ( )
* 0 t d > , automatically determines the new satisfaction threshold 
*
1 St C + ,  which more demanding by definition than the previous one. This new threshold will be 
faced by the new alternative technologies emerging during the next period.  
 
***
1 StStt CC d + =+           [11] 
Building upon Simon´s ideas44, this threshold evolution should depend on the previously 
obtained results and the ease with which they are obtained. If the threshold were static, the 
search could end prematurely (low-demanding) or, in the opposite case, n ever finalize (high-
demanding)
45. We therefore assume that the threshold moves gradually: the Agency’s 
satisfaction threshold will rise to the same extent that it finds easily satisfactory alternatives; 
in the opposite case, the threshold will remain stable 46. So, we propose that 
*
t d  be a direct 
                                                                                                                                                             
41 The underlying assumption here is that technological d evelopment in  0 t =  is not very advanced. Therefore, following 
Simon´s (1964, 1972) assertions concerning pragmatism when setting a satisfaction threshold, it seems reasonable to 
establish at the outset a value nearest to 0 than to 1, within the performance range. 
42 As shown in Appendix 4, in the base scenario technology population stabilizes around a dozen alternatives, constantly 
changing and renewed in its composition. 
43 We want to emphasize that in no case are we suggesting the Agency optimises, given that we assume its bounded 
rationality.  We propose a dynamic approach to Simon´s satisfaction model (static). Optimization implies future evaluation of 
today’s available alternatives, choosing the one that maximices an objective function within a determined horizon, assuming 
some probabilities.  On the contrary, dynamic satisfaction implies actual evaluation of currently available technologies and 
choosing the one which better satisfies a threshold today. In Laville (1998) a wider discussion can be found about divergence 
among optimization and bounded rationality and satisfaction under adaptation mechanisms. 
44 See Barba-Romero and Pomerol (1997: 290). 
45 Laville (1998). 
46 In Kemp (1997: 230) we find a real example of increasingly demanding threshold effectiveness: “The regulation of CFC 
use is even unique in one respect: the regulations have been tightened several times instead of being softened, to give 
industry more time to comply with regulations (...) On the whole, government policy seem to have been a success in making 
a relative quick and smooth transition away from CFCs.” IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




function of the gap between 
*
St C   and 
*
1 St C - , and an inverse function of the number 
E
t J  of 




t T -  and 
* j
t T : 
 









=         [12] 
with 
*
t d  as a number within range [ ] 0,1 .
47 
 
Thus the Agency, sets a shifting and affordable threshold on the basis of its past experiences 
(expressions [11] and [12]) and modifies its incentives to achieve it (expressions [7], [8] and 
[9]). In other words, the Agency learns and responds flexibly according to events, following 
prevention and transition policies. 
 
Lastly, we define as the standard or dominant technology in  t  that 
jST
t T   which achieves a 
market share  %
jST
t j II > ￿ , for  2 t J >  technologies
48, for a t least 
ST t  periods. We define as a 
“challenging technology” in  t  that 
jCH
t T  which first exceeds the market share of 
jST
t T , once 
the latter has ceased to be the standard. Here,  rp t  (replacement time) is the moment at which 
jCH
t T  replaces 
jST
t T  (by exceeding its market share). 
j
t F  is the actual fitness
49 of technology 
j at time  t, defined as 
j
Akt AkCAk ￿ . 
ij
t F  is the perceived fitness of technology j (i.e. the 
average perception of the  i users of this technology) at time  t , defined as  
( )
ijj
Aktt iAkCAkI Øø ºß ￿￿ . 
 
Table 1 recaps the (independent) variables used in the m odel to characterize the industry 
represented and the attributes of the technology standardization process (dependent variables), 





                                                   
47 In the simulation, the addition of 
*
t d  to 
*
St C is necessarily always less than 1. 
48 In the simulation, this condition (for  2 t J >  technologies) will only apply in the initial moments after the emergence of the 
industry given that with a small number of technologies (<2) the fact that one of them obtains more than 50% of adopters 
may be the result of chance (first mover advantage) rather than its merit. However, if later on while one technology is 
dominant the others reduced their share or disappeared altogether, it would not make sense to say that the non-fulfilment of 
the condition (for  2 t J >  technologies) caused the technology in question to lose its recognition as the standard, given that it 
had obtained it by its own merits. 
49  Nelson (1995:  64) defines the ‘fitness’ of a technology as its ability to resolve a specific technology problem better; 
Saviotti (2001: 207) defines it as the technology’s ability to adapt to the environment in which it operates. IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




Table 1. Recap of the variables and parameters of the model 
Characteristics of the industry (independent variables used in the model) 
Paramete
r 
Definition and interpretation 
T l   Average rate at which new available technologies appear during the period in the 
industry (“average rate of innovation”). 
T P   Minimum number of adopters the technology needs to obtain within time  T t   in 
order to survive (“scale of network” necessary). 
T t   Maximum time in which a technology needs to obtain  T P   adopters in order to 
survive (“competitiveness of the technology market”) 
r   Average rate of improvement with the adoption of technologies  j T  emerging within 
the same period  t  (“degree of increasing returns to adoption”) 
r s   Dispersion of the average rate of improvement with the adoption of technologies  j T  
emerging within the same period  t  (“degree of differentiation in the capabilities of 
the technology providers”) 
P l   Average rate at which new active producers appear in each period (“barriers to 
entry”). 
s  “Average survival of firms” 
s s   Dispersion of the average survival of firms (“competitiveness of the industry”) 
c   “Rate of communication” between users 
b   Probability that an agent  i  replaces his technology  j  at time  t  (“tendency to 
technological obsolescence in the industry”; “cost of technological change in the 
industry”). 
ST% I   Minimum market share  –in terms of the relative number of adopters– that a 
technology needs to achieve during 
ST t  periods in order to be considered the 
industry’s “standard” technology. 
ST t
  Minimum time a technology needs to maintain the minimum market share 
ST% I  in 
order to be considered the industry’s “standard” technology. 
 
Attributes of the technology standardization process (dependent variables) 
Variable  Definition and interpretation 
ST
0 t   Emergence: for each simulation, the initial moment t in which a technology 
exceeds a share 
ST% I  of the active users (for  2 t J > ) for at least 
ST t  periods, thus 
becoming the standard. 
ST fr   Frequency: the number of times the above event occurs over the course of each 
simulation. 
jST v   Speed: for each standard, the time elapsing in the experiment between the entry of a 
technology in the market and its acceptance as a standard. 
jST d   Duration: for each standard, the time elapsed (greater than 
ST t  periods) during 
which a technology’s share of users remains above 
ST% I  (for  t J>2). IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




jST p   Depth: for each standard, the maximum share achieved by the technology during the 
time it remains the standard. 
jST scs   Susceptibility to changes in supply: for each standard, the magnitude of 
improvement necessary in the perceived performance of an alternative technology to 
break its dominance (percentage variation between 
ijR
t F  and 
ijST
t F  at replacement 
time  r t ). 
jST scd   Susceptibility to changes in demand: for each standard, the magnitude of the change 
in preferences of the users needed to break the dominance of a standard technology. 
Defined as 
jST
AkAk k scdabab =￿=￿ ￿
rr
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i ii
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Other model dependent variables 
Variable  Definition and interpretation 
ST
jST
t F   Actual fitness of the technology standard  j  at the time  ST t  when it becomes the 
standard. Defined as 
,
jST
Akt AktSTCAk ￿ . 
ST
jBAT
t F   Actual fitness of the technology that would have been the best alternative 
technology  j , (simultaneously or beforehand) a standard in the  ST t  moment at 
which it becomes the standard as such and is adopted by an equivalent number of 
users. Defined as  
,
jBAT
Akt AktSTCAk ￿ . 
ced  
Cumulative environmental damage ( t tDA ￿ ) at the horizon of each simulation in 
the experiment without the intervention of the Agency. 
ceda  
Cumulative environmental damage ( t tDA ￿ ) at the horizon of each simulation in 
the same experiment with the intervention of the Agency. 
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3.2. Calibration of the model 
Given our interest in its dynamic properties and the difficulty of its mathematical treatment, 
the agent based model (ABM) described has been developed to run in MATLAB
TM, a specific 
mathematics-oriented programming language, r ecognized for its capabilities and versatility.
50  
In keeping with the philosophy of ABM, we have sought to use this flexibility to provide a 
research methodology to enhance our understanding of the basic processes which might 
appear in various applications, and not represent or make specific predictions regarding a 
particular empirical application. Thus, when calibrating the model (base scenario) we opted 
for a set of theoretically acceptable parameters obtained from the literature, but which are not 
intended to represent precisely any particular situation or industry. The subsequent sensitivity 




ST I % , Anderson and Tushman (1990) consider a dominant design (standard) to 
have emerged when a new architecture obtains 50% or more of the installed processes
51 and 
maintains this market share for at least 3 consecutive years
52. Various studies of different 
industries in a number of countries (Klepper and Simons, 1997; Gort and Klepper, 1982) 
confirm that a value of 15 for the parameter  P l  may be theoretically acceptable for the base 
scenario. As regards the parameters  s and  s s , studies such as those by Klepper and Simons 
(1997), Mata and Portugal (1994) or Tegarden  et al. (2000) suggest that values in the base 
scenario for  s and  s s  of 5 and 2 years, respectively, are of a theoretically acceptable order of 
magnitude.  Klepper and Simons (1997) also offer guidance as to an approximate magnitude 
for  T l . In the base scenario we have opted for a value of 1. 
 
Unlike the previous parameters, which are populational, and whose magnitudes can be 
justified from empirical studies, the way the underlying assumptions were decided for the 
remainder of the initial parameters in the model was more ad hoc. Where possible, we have 
sought to justify the values used on the basis of t he preceding values. In this way, given the 
magnitude (justified) of the entry and exit of firms to and from the industry, which leads the 
industry to stabilize in the base scenario with a population of almost 80 firms which are 
constantly being renewed, w e believe it reasonable that a technology should be adopted by at 
least 5 firms ( T P ) within 2 years ( T t ) in the base scenario in order for it not to be considered 
“rejected” by the productive system and for network economies t o come into play, allowing it 
to compete with the other technologies. Given this value of  T P , if we ascribe a value of 0.2 to 
the maximum dispersion 
j
Akt s   of the perceived performances 
ij
Akt C  around the actual 
                                                   
50  Our model has been designed to make it straightforward for the analyst to enter the starting-point conditions of the 
experiment.  It is possible to modify the magnitudes of the initial parameters describing the industry (rate of innovation, 
barriers to entry, rate of increasing returns, etc.) and the general conditions of the experiment (number of dimensions of the 
technology, number of iterations per simulation and number of simulations per experiment). It also allows a random seed to 
be saved and reused under different conditions.  As well as experimenting with a “base scenario”, it is possible to perform 
multiple sensitivity analyses on the various parameters of the model. Finally, this model generates a wide range of graphics 
and numerical tables recording the paths taken and giving details of the different perspectives of the process of technological 
change we are interested in studying. The source code of the model can, of course, be requested from the author, together 
with the technical details of the modular structure of the program, the names and descriptions of the model’s variables, and 
the routines it contains. 
51 This condition can obviously only be obtained by one technology at any time  . 
52 In their various studies Anderson and Tushman vary this figure between 3 and 4 years. IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




performance of a technology 
j
Akt C  ([ ] 0,1 ˛ ), according to expression [5] the rate of 
communication  c  should have a value of 0.8. In the same way, if the maximum values that 
can be achieved by 
j
Ak C `￿  and 
0
j
Ak C  are 1 and 0.5, respectively, from expression [4] we can 
deduce that a rate  r  of around 0.5 places the “frontier of technological improvement” at 
approximately 50% in an industry of 80 firms. In other words, we are assuming that only o ne 
technology standard can reach its full performance potential, which, at all events, is limited 
(<1). We also establish a deviation  r s = 0.2 to ensure a certain degree of diversity between 
the technological alternatives. With regard to the initial parameters that define the Agency´s 
behaviour, it was argued earlier that, following Simon´s (1964, 1972) assertions concerning 
pragmatism when setting a satisfaction threshold, it seems reasonable to establish initially a 
value nearer to 0 than to 1, within the performance range. So, we ascribe in  0 t =  a value of 
0.1  to  [ ] 0,1
*
St C ˛ .  Additionally, we establish a tentative initial support  [ ] 0 0,1
j D˛   at a 
minimum level of 0.1, and ascribe a value of 0.8 to the rate  [ ] 0,1 t˛  at which support 
intensity grows and decreases exponentially. 
 
The maximum capacity for damage or waste assimilation and natural resources regeneration 
of the ecosystem affected by business activity  [ ] 0,1 DA˛ `ˆˆ￿  is established at 0.7, a level over 
which environmental damages become irreversible if their source remains active for more 
than  ￿
DA t  = 10 periods. 
 
Lastly, the value of 0.2 assigned to  b  (probability that agent  i  replaces his technology  j at 
time  t ) in the model is justified by the relative tendency to technological obsolescence and 
the considerable costs of technological change in the industry. 
 
3.3. Numerical simulations 
In order to fulfil the aims of the investigation and check the hypotheses set out below, we ran 
an experiment using the base scenario, involving 150 simulations of 50 iterations each, using 
different random seeds in each simulation
53. As a sample, and for reasons of space, Appendix 
2 presents only the first 10 simulations of all the standards recorded in each simulation. The 
table in the appendix shows the different characteristics of each of the standards, and the 
                                                   
53 To decide on the appropriate number of simulations in the main experiment we first ran a pilot in which 15 simulations 




t F , 
ST
jBAT
t F ,  jST scs ,  jST scd ,  ced  and  ceda , involved in the hypotheses H1, H2, H3 and H4. When a 
confidence of 95% was required (za = 1.96), for reasonable amplitude intervals of  d , the variable requiring the largest 
sample  n  was  jST scs , which required a sample of around 70 cases of at least one standard (see the following note), an 






















As regards the choice of 50 iterations per simulation, this number was selected because it was considered a sufficiently 
distant horizon to enable the phenomenon of a series of successive standards to be studied. A remoter horizon did not yield 
different conclusions, but required more computation time in the experiments. IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




complete standardization process, recorded in each “history” (simulation) of this industry, 
according to the attributes described above (time, frequency, speed, duration, depth, 
susceptibility to changes in supply and in changes in demand).  Appendix 3 shows the data  for 
the first standard recorded in each simulation, filtered out from the general results of the 150 
simulations. The characteristics of these standards will be examined in more detail below
54. 
 
The set of graphs included in Appendix 4 shows the results of  a typical model simulation 
using the base scenario. The first graph shows the time course of the adoption (market shares 
as a unit proportion) of the technologies by the various producers present in each moment in 
the industry producing good  X. Following A nderson and Tushman (1990), technologies that 
exceed a 50% share for at least 3 periods are identified as technology standards
55. It is worth 
highlighting the striking visual isomorphism between the results of the model and the patterns 
of the phenomenon observed in real industries as, according to Marney and Tarbert (2000), 
this may be considered an indicator of the validity of the model.  In a test of external validity, 
as understood by Kleijnen (1998), in Appendix 5 it is possible to see that our model offers a 
representation of the phenomenon of technological succession consistent with the empirical 
evidence on the diffusion of technologies in industries as diverse as RAM chips, steel 
manufacturing or power generation. 
 
Unlike conventional models of technology diffusion and standardization, which focus on the 
rate at which  one new technology diffuses until it is fully adopted, our model enables a 
broader approximation to the  process of technological change to be obtained, from the 
perspective of the  extension of the diffusion of  multiple alternative technologies and the 
related phenomenon of standardization. Previously, we pointed out that in addition to Arthur, 
many other authors have portrayed the technology selection process as an “all or nothing” 
story ( Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1997). This is a general shortcoming of diffusion and 
standardization models that has been pointed out repeatedly in various studies over the last 
decade (Schilling, 2002: 395; Jaffe  et al., 2000: 41; Windrum and Birchenhall, 1998: 112; 
David, 1997: 36; Nelson, 1994b; David and Greenstein, 1990: 8). Despite the various forces 
(positive feedbacks) that help reinforce the dominant position of a technology standard, 
experience shows that no standard remains in place in an industry indefinitely (Abrahamson 
and Rosenkopf, 1997; Ruttan, 1997; Witt, 1997; Grübler, 1990; Ausubel, 1989). On the 
contrary, in reality, if a long enough horizon is taken, one sees a succession of standards, a 
dynamic of transition between unstable equilibria, which this model is able to represent and 
characterize. 
 
It is rare for a technology standard to achieve absolute diffusion in an industry, where this is 
understood to mean a 100% market share. By contrast, one often observes how different 
degrees of standard coexist with less successful technological alternatives, which may survive 
for a variable length of time in market niches (Grübler, 1990; Dalle, 1995; Freeman, 1996). 
The existence of these niches is explained both by the emergence of new alternatives, which 
start to build their own installed user base, and by the heterogeneity of users’ preferences, 
                                                   
54 We consider the first standard to be representative of the characteristics of the rest of the standards in the same simulation, 
and given that it is the one produced in the greatest number of simulations, its choice ensures the greatest number of data. 
Those standards that emerge at the start of the experiment and continue to dominate through to the end are considered outliers 
and discarded. 
55 The number next to the word “standard” (simulator otputs in Spanish: “estándar”) identifies the technology in question and 
represents its order of appearance in the history of the industry shown. IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




which may circumstantially maintain different groups apart from the dominant standard. 
Again, the proposed model makes it possible to show in greater detail than conventional “all-
or-nothing” models (which, moreover, usually focus on the competition between just two 
alternatives) the reality of an industry divided at all times between multiple available 
alternatives, all with different levels of adoption at each moment in time. 
 
The second graph of the first line of Appendix 4, equivalent to that described, shows the 
results of a parallel experiment under identical conditions, but with the presence of an Agency 
in the terms defined in the model’s assumptions. The third graph shows the time course of the 
environmental damage without the intervention of the Agency (red) and with the intervention 
of the Agency (blue). We will return to this graph later. The first graph on the second line 
shows the time course of the environmental damage with the intervention of the Agency, and 
the intensity of the effort needed to avoid the system’s becoming locked in to environmentally 
inferior technology standards, thus orienting technological change towards a sustainable path. 
The last two graphs show the evolution of the population of firms and the population of 
technologies, respectively. 
 
4. Examination of hypotheses 
It was argued above that in the presence of increasing returns to adoption the market may 
become locked-in in favour of one of the competing alternatives due to historical 
circumstances. It is a recurring statement in the literature on this issue that under these 
conditions there is no guarantee that there are no alternatives to the winning technology that 
would have had lower unit costs if they had achieved an equivalent position of market 
dominance (Arthur, 1989; David, 1989; Cowan, 1990; Metcalfe, 1994). Moreover, throughout 
this paper we have maintained that the technology path followed by an industry is shaped by 
chance historical events ( path dependency). Thus we can state that the distribution of market 
shares between the different technological alternatives at any given time, and the succession 
of possible technological standards, will depend on the one hand on the chance order in which 
these alternatives are available for adoption and that in which the potential adopters enter and 
exit the industry. It will also depend on the characteristics of each of these heterogeneous 
“populations” (technologies and firms)  at each time (performances and preferences, 
respectively). 
 
Hypothesis 1. In an industry characterized by increasing returns to technology 
adoption, over a sufficiently long time horizon, we will witness a succession of 
multiple alternative equilibria (standards), which cannot be anticipated and are not 
necessarily Pareto-optimal. 
 
Proof. In the table of general results in Appendix 2 it is possible to see how the different 
“histories” of the industry represented by the various simulations do indeed show alternative 
technological paths which cannot be anticipated in advance. The data in column 2 of the table 
(ID_ST, identifier of standard  j) show that in the various simulations (SIM is the number of 
the simulation) different standards emerge, each of them characterized by a different initial 




 (columns 5 to 9). Under the same initial conditions, with an identical 
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adopters (order of e ntry and exit, characteristics, preferences, etc.) leads the different 
simulations (“histories” of the industry) to different standard technologies in each case.  
Clearly, these paths of technological change cannot be anticipated by the agents participating 
in the industry, as their course depends on unpredictable events. In this respect the model 
presented here overcomes the determinism to which the traditional assumptions leads and 
allows this theoretical exercise to be performed in a way which shows how  different 
sequences of events in the same industry can lead to different technology paths. 
 
With regard to the second part of Hypothesis 1, the possible non-Pareto-optimal nature of the 
equilibria (standards) arrived at implies that as a result of the presence of increasing returns to 
adoption, uncoordinated adoption decisions by mutually influenced producers may lead the 
industry, in a dynamic conditioned by the way events unfold, to an inferior technology 
standard than that which could have been achieved  had they chosen one of the available 
alternatives in a coordinated way (Arthur, 1989; Cowan, 1990; David, 1993). Obviously,  ex 
post  it is impossible to confirm or refute this statement empirically (Nelson, 1994: 141). 
Under certain reasonable assumptions t he model presented allows a counter-factual exercise 
comparing the performance of a dominant technology at the time when it becomes the 
standard and the hypothetical performance that the other alternatives coexisting with it or 
preceding it would have achieved if they had been adopted by an equal number of users. 
Column 10 (FIT_ST, 
ST
jST
t F  ) of Appendix 3 shows the actual fitness of the technological 
standard (column 2, ID_ST) at the moment (column 3, TST) at which it becomes the standard. 
Column 11 (FIT_BAT, 
ST
jBAT
t F ) shows the actual fitness the best alternative technology from 
among those coexisting with or preceding the technology when it became the standard would 
have achieved (column 12, ID_BAT) had it been adopted by an equal number of users. It can 
be seen that in a significant
56 number of cases FIT_BAT exceeds FIT_ST, which leads us also 
to accept the second part of Hypothesis 1. 
 
As described earlier, on Anderson and Tushman’s (1990) view of the technology cycle, the 
transition between two standards is usually presented as the result of a technological 
discontinuity. In Foster’s terms (1986), there needs to be a “jump” of a certain order of 
magnitude between two S -shaped technology performance curves. Other authors have also 
suggested that it is necessary for there to be a significant improvement in the performance of 
an alternative to the standard in order to overcome the inertia of the system and initiate the 
transition from a locked-in technology to a new one ( Grove, 1996; Drucker, 1993). A number 
of empirical studies have tried to quantify this order of magnitude in specific industries and 
historical circumstances. One frequently cited example is that of David (1985), who 
concluded that 20-30% savings were insufficient to cause a transition from the QWERTY 
system to the Dvorak keyboard. However, we do not have a formal generalizable observation 
of this fact in technology transitions. This model enables us to examine statistically whether 
this is the case. It also makes it possible to measure, as will be shown below, the relationship 
between the magnitude of the improvement necessary to produce a technology transition and 
                                                   
56 I t is not, however, a  statistically significant number of cases.  In column 8 of Appendix 2 the dichotomous variable 
FST_FB1 = 1 when FIT_BAT > FIT_ST and = 0 otherwise. According to the results of a non-parametric (binomial) analysis 
of proportionality on FST_FBI which does not allow us to state that the proportion of zeroes is different from that of ones for 
any reasons other than chance (bilateral asymptotic significance = 0.644). Given that FIT_BAT and FIT_ST are distributed 
normally, we also performed a T-test for independent samples (for this purpose the variable FST_FB2 was created, with 
values 1 and 2 for each group) throwing up an equivalent result as that in the previous comparison (t=-1.408; bil. sig.=0.161). 
At all events, to accept this second part of H1 it is enough to demand that FIT_BAT is greater than FIT_ST on at least one 
occasion, as in fact happens. IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




the different characteristics of the various industries in which a transition of this kind takes 
place (rates of innovation, barriers to entry, etc.) 
 
Hypothesis 2.  The emergence of an alternative to the locked-in technology 
(standard) that offers a sufficient improvement in its characteristics (technology 
supply side), can lead the cumulative endogenous phenomena in the industry, which 
derive from the presence of increasing returns to adoption, to break with the 
standard and trigger the transition towards the next standard, without the need for 
intervention from outside the industry. 
 
Proof. Column 15 of the table of results in Appendix 3 shows, for each standard, its 
susceptibility to changes in supply ( jST scs ), previously defined as the magnitude of the 
necessary improvement in performance for an alternative technology to break its dominance 
(percentage variation in 
ijCH
t F  and 
ijST
t F  at time  rp t ). In an interval of confidence of 95% for 
the average between 17.07 and 32.78, the variable  
jST scs  takes an average value of 24.93% in 
the base s cenario, with a standard error of 3.94. According to results of a T -test (t=6.330; 
bilateral significance < 0.01) the average of the sample is statistically non-zero and the value 
0 is outside the confidence interval. In other words, the model confirms Hypothesis 2: the 
emergence of an alternative technology to the locked-in technology (standard) which presents 
a sufficient improvement in its characteristics (in this base scenario, of the order of 25%) can 
cause the system to escape the lock-in endogenously (technology supply side). 
 
However, the evidence (Kemp, 1997: 281; Cowan and Hulten, 1996) reveals that a 
technology standard’s loss of the dominant position is not always solely due to the emergence 
of an alternative offering significantly better performance. To obtain a more realistic view of 
the internal processes explaining the dynamics of diffusion and the succession of standards, 
the proposed model also incorporates the importance of possible changes on the demand side, 
which it represents as changes in the preferences of the possible adopters. 
 
Hypothesis 3.  A sufficient change in the average preferences of potential adopters 
regarding the features of technologies (technology demand side), can lead the 
cumulative endogenous phenomena in the industry, which derives from the presence 
of increasing returns to adoption, to break with the standard and trigger the 
transition towards the next standard, without the need for intervention from outside 
the industry.. 
 
Proof.  Column 16 of the table of results in Appendix 3 shows, for each standard, its 
susceptibility to changes in demand ( jST scd ), defined above as the magnitude of the necessary 
change in user preferences to break its dominance (see  table 1 ). Within an interval of 
confidence of 95% for  the average between 2.84 and 3.95, the variable  jST scd  takes an 
average value of 3.40%, with a standard error of 0.28. According to results of a T -test 
(t=12.261; bilateral significance < 0.01) the average of the sample is statistically non-zero and 
the value zero is outside the confidence interval. In other words, the results of the model 
confirm H3: a sufficiently large change in the average preferences of potential adopters IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




regarding technology features (in this base scenario, of the order of  3.5%) can cause the 
system to escape the lock-in endogenously (technology demand side). 
As argued on the preceding pages, the broadening spectrum of environmental problems, the 
uncertainty regarding their scale and duration, and their possible irreversibility, in the context 
of the growing social preference for environmental quality, make it necessary to undertake an 
ex ante  (precautionary) approach to the link between productive activity and environmental 
quality. As we have sought to show in this paper, t his link lies in technology, and the right 
approach is to understand how the process of technological change can lead towards 
sustainability. The added value of Evolutionary Economics in the context of environmental 
policy resides mainly in the fact that i t warns that certain inferior environmental technologies 
may be locked in to the economic system. As we have seen, this model shows that 
endogenous changes within the industry, on either the supply side (i.e. the emergence of new 
technologies that are notably superior to the locked-in technology) or the demand side (i.e. 
changes in the average preferences of potential adopters) can enable a transition between 
equilibria to take place within the system without the need for public intervention. However, 
the t iming of this spontaneous transition may not be the socially most appropriate. The main 
justification we offer for public intervention in the process of technology diffusion in the 
presence of increasing returns to adoption, and hence which may result in a  succession of 
environmentally sub-optimal technology standards, lies in the greater ability of the State to 
coordinate technology choices and achieve a environmentally superior timing. 
 
Hypothesis  4.  If we accept the global nature, uncertainty, complexity and 
irreversibility of environmental problems, the intervention of a coordinator acting in 
accordance with sustainability criteria in the technological choices of adopters, 
exploiting the cumulative phenomena arising from increasing returns to adoption, 
could guide technological change onto a better path in environmental terms and 
reduce the risk of irreversible damage to the environment. 
 
Proof. Columns 17 and 19 of Appendix 3 show the cumulative environmental damage 
( t t DA ￿ ) at the horizon of  each simulation in the experiment without the intervention of the 
Agency (ced ) and the cumulative environmental damage at the horizon of each simulation in 
the experiment with the intervention of the Agency (ceda)57. The fact that in the results of 
this experiment only the variable  ceda has a normal distribution, as shown by a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (ced : 0.142,  sig. 0.001;  ceda: 0.071, sig. 0.200), rules out the possibility of a T-
test to c onfirm the hypothesis that the averages of each of the variables are the same. Instead, 
we ran a non-parametric (binomial) proportionality test, the results of which confirm that the 
proportion of cases58 in which  dac   is less than  das   is statistically different from that which 
might have arisen by chance (50%) (bilateral asymptotic significance < 0.01). The hypothesis 
H4 is therefore accepted. Obviously, the proven effectiveness of a coordination mechanism 
                                                   
57 As mentioned a few pages back, our model has been developed in such a way as to allow the simultaneous execution of 
two parallel experiments using the same scenario and the same random seed, the first without the intervention of the Agency 
( 0
j
t D= , i.e. the agents decide on the technologies based only on their individual adoption criteria 
j
Akt C ), and the second 
with the intervention of the Agency  ( 0
j
t D„, i.e. the same agents decide on the same technologies on the basis of 
j
Akt C  and 
j
t D ).  The results of the two experiments are therefore fully comparable and make it possible to observe the technological 
path of the industry and its environmental consequences without any coordination of the technology adoption decisions and 
what the technology path would have been with coordination guided by sustainability criteria. 
58 For this purpose, the dichotomous variable CED_CEDA was created. This variable takes the value 1 when CEDA is less 
than CED and 0 otherwise. IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




such as that modelled depends on the starting point hypotheses, in particular the flexibility 
and rapidity of the response of the Agency. Although it is debatable whether this mechanism 
could be put in practice with this degree of flexibility and rapidity of response, we consider 
the model and the confirmation of hypothesis H4 to at least support the desirability of an 
approach to the problem like that proposed
59. 
The model allows us to show graphically the positive influence of the Agency’s intervention 
on the environmental performance of industry. Figure 2 shows the typical results of our 
model, showing the time course of the environmental damage (and the existence of 
irreversible damage, as defined in the model), with and without the intervention of the 











Fig 2. Results of a typical simulation with the model 
(time course of environmental damage) 
 
5. Conclusions 
Unlike conventional models of technology diffusion and standardization, which focus on t he 
rate at which one new technology diffuses until reaching full adoption, the model presented 
here enables a broader approximation to the process of technological change to be obtained, 
encompassing the diffusion of multiple alternative technologies and t he phenomenon of a 
succession of standards, as has been observed empirically. Experience shows that no standard 
remains in place in an industry indefinitely, and it is unusual for a technology standard to 
achieve total diffusion. By contrast, in reality, o ver a sufficient horizon it is possible to 
observe a succession of standards of differing degrees that coexist with less successful 
                                                   
59 In this regard we second the words of the Nobel prizewinner for Economics, Amartya K. Sen, who in his book Choice of 
Techniques, after arguing for an elaborate model of technology choice for developing economies which was highly 
demanding of the capabilities of its Planning Commission, justified the value of his proposal in the following terms (Sen, 
1960: 80): “(...) Can we really work all this out? The answer is of course, NO. What then is the justification for what we have 
been saying so far? That will become clear if we try to see what is the alternative approach. There hardly seems to be any 
alternative approach that can be considered satisfactory (…) If the approach is complicated it is because the real world is not 
simple. In practice it might not be possible to obtain a perfect solution. This does not, however, that the problem is hopeless. 
The approach outlined in the preceding pages shows in what lines we have to proceed. How far we can go that line will of 
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alternative technologies, which may survive for varying lengths of time in niche markets. The 
proposed model makes it possible to show with greater detail than conventional “all-or-
nothing” models (which, moreover, usually focus on the competition between just two 
alternatives) the reality of the dynamics of transition between unstable equilibria in an 
industry divided at all t imes between multiple available alternatives, all with different levels 
of adoption at each moment in time. Our model overcomes the determinism of conventional 
models of technology lock-in by representing the process of standardization and technological 
succession dynamically and allowing for the renewal and heterogeneity of technology supply 
and demand. 
 
It is a recurring theme in the literature on technology diffusion that in the presence of 
increasing returns to adoption the market may become locked-in i n favour of one of the 
competing alternatives due to historical circumstances. There is no guarantee that there are no 
alternatives to the winning technology that would have had lower unit costs if they had 
achieved an equivalent position of market domination. This model makes it possible to 
confirm the path dependence and possible non-optimality of uncoordinated adoption, which is 
frequently argued for in the literature but rarely formalized. 
 
Various authors have also suggested that it is necessary for there to be a significant 
improvement in the performance of an alternative to the standard to overcome the inertia of 
the of the system and initiate the transition from a locked-in technology to a new one ( supply 
side). Although a number of empirical studies have attempted to quantify this order of 
magnitude in specific industries and historical moments, there is no formal or generalizable 
confirmation of this fact in technology transitions. The evidence also shows that the loss of 
dominant position by a technology standard is not always  solely due to the emergence of an 
alternative offering significantly better performance. It may also be due to changes on the 
technology  demand side. The proposed model has also allowed us to examine the hypothesis 
that either a sufficient improvement in the features  of alternative technologies or a sufficient 
change in the preferences of potential adopters regarding a technology’s features can cause 
cumulative endogenous industry phenomena, deriving from the presence of increasing returns 
to adoption, to break with the standard and trigger the transition towards the next standard, 
without the need for intervention from outside the industry. 
 
The problem of technology lock-in is potentially significant when the impact of technology 
choices on the natural environment is considered. From this perspective, the quest for 
sustainable technological change implies that policy-makers face the challenge of preventing 
and escaping from technology lock-in in environmentally unsustainable practices and 
systems. As we have seen, this model shows that endogenous changes within the industry, on 
either the supply side or the demand side, can enable a transition between equilibria to take 
place within the system without the need for public intervention. However, the timing of this 
spontaneous transition may not be the socially most appropriate. The main justification we 
offer for public intervention in the process of technology diffusion where there are increasing 
returns to adoption, which may result in a succession of environmentally sub-optimal 
technology standards, lies in the greater ability of the State to  coordinate technology choices 
and achieve environmentally superior timing. Based on a number of plausible assumptions, 
our model has made i t possible to evaluate the frequently argued-for, but again rarely 
demonstrated, desirability of a coordination mechanism to guide the process of technological 
change towards the path of sustainability. IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 





By incorporating an evolutionary view of technological change and sustainable development, 
in this study we have proposed a novel taxonomy of techo-environmental policies (prevention 
and transition), complementary to conventional environmental polices, which permits a more 
formal justification of the appropriateness to new sustainability problems of the various 
instruments available in practice, and to which previously little attention had been paid by 
governments. IE Working Paper                                     WP 02 /04                                        19/01/2004 




Appendix 1. Algorithm for support by the Agency 
 
We start out by assuming that the notion of  dynamic and reactive support can be represented 
by an exponential function. First of all, we represent the three “pure” cases in which the 
tendency of the support ( i.  decreasing,  ii.  increasing proportionally, and  iii.  increasing more 
than proportionally)  set by the decision criterion (relationship between  t DA ,  DA `ˆˆ￿  and  1 t DA- ) 
is constant over time. In case (i) where the environmental damage in the current period  t DA  is 
below the maximum damage  DA `ˆˆ￿  and the damage in the previous period  1 t DA- , it is clear that 
the intensity of the support  [ ] 0,1
j
t D˛ , which starts from a tentative initial level  0
j D , should be 
decreasing (we assume a rate of  [ ] 0,1 t ˛ ). I t may even disappear (asymptote at 0) if the 








In case (ii) where the environmental damage in the current period  t DA  is below the maximum 
damage  DA `ˆˆ￿  but exceeds the damage in the previous period  1 t DA- , the intensity of the support 
j
t D , which starts from a tentative initial level  0
j D , should increase proportionally (we assume a 
rate of  [ ] 0,1 t ˛ ). It may even reach a maximum (asymptote at 1) if the damage in  t  relative 







Lastly, in case ( iii) where the environmental damage in the current period  t DA  is above the 
maximum damage  DA `ˆˆ￿ , the intensity of the support 
j
t D , that starts from a tentative initial level 
0
j D , should increase more than proportionally ( we assume that the rate of  [ ] 0,1 t ˛  is 
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t DADA > `ˆˆ￿  approaches the period of irreversible damage   ￿
DA t ). Thus, the intensity of the 
support 
j
t D  rapidly reaches it maximum level (asymptote at 1) if the damage in  t remains 







Given the way the environmental damage function [6] has been defined, we cannot e xpect the 
relationship between t DA ,  DA `ˆˆ￿  and  1 t DA-  to remain constant over time as in previous 
representations. The decision algorithm of the Agency will respond at each time  t  with one of 
these functions 
j
t D  depending on the aggregate environmental result of the individual 
adoption decisions. On the first occasion, the dynamic support 
j
t D  will start from a tentative 
initial level  0
j D  (which can be modified in the simulation).  However, on successive 
occasions, obviously the intensity of the support 
j
t D  will start from the intensity on the last 
occasion  c t  on which the evolution of the damage changed direction (
j
c D ), i.e. change of case 
(i,  ii,  iii). In this mode, the proposed functions [7], [8] and [9] are identical to those 
represented above, with the difference that in each  t they start from 
j
c D  and “set the counter 
to 0” in  c t : 
 
Results of a typical simulation 
(time course of environmental damage vs. support intensity;  DA `ˆ￿ =0.7; 
j
o D =0.1) 
time ( t )  0 
1
0
j D  
  ( ) 0 11
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Appendix 2. Experiment using the base scenario, 150 simulations of 50 iterations each, using different random seeds in each simulation 
(sample of the first 10 simulations) 
   
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25 
SIM  ID_ST  TST  TFST  CA01  CA02  CA03  CA04  CA05  FIT_ST  FIT_BAT  ID_BAT  FST  VST  DST  PST  ID_CHT  TRP  SCS  SCD  CED  F_ICED  CEDA  F_ICEDA  AC_SU 
1  1  3  50  0,254  0,451  0,101  0,157  0,329  0,650  0,692  3  1  0  47  0,988          48,240  1  41,111  1  45,100 
2  1  2  50  0,058  0,422  0,478  0,366  0,269  0,716  0,576  2  1  0  48  0,989          49,261  1  44,127  1  46,759 
3  2  2  11  0,469  0,390  0,272  0,370  0,397  0,722  0,674  3  3  1  9  0,847  9  12  -2,425  6,722  33,829  0  33,406  1  35,436 
3  9  16  20  0,443  0,127  0,416  0,041  0,190  0,488  0,769  8  3  11  4  0,667  17  24  -2,425  3,307  33,829  0  33,406  1  35,436 
3  9  47  50  0,443  0,127  0,416  0,041  0,190  0,508  0,866  28  3  40  3  0,688          33,829  0  33,406  1  35,436 
4  3  4  10  0,191  0,410  0,134  0,350  0,292  0,746  0,723  5  2  3  6  0,667  12  9  1,980  4,213  37,247  1  35,617  0  32,484 
4  14  16  19  0,464  0,412  0,155  0,082  0,178  0,679  0,746  3  2  4  3  0,730  20  20  1,980  2,228  37,247  1  35,617  0  32,484 
6  1  28  34  0,244  0,264  0,440  0,185  0,208  0,499  0,781  14  2  27  6  0,713          27,022  0  33,155  0  26,886 
6  1  35  43  0,244  0,264  0,440  0,185  0,208  0,499  0,781  14  2  34  8  0,713          27,022  0  33,155  0  26,886 
7  13  15  18  0,188  0,282  0,405  0,418  0,486  0,579  0,699  2  1  4  3  0,667  20  24  56,295  6,936  37,010  2  27,140  0  23,272 
8  2  2  6  0,497  0,248  0,201  0,147  0,476  0,766  0,731  4  1  1  4  0,907  6  5  -5,472  2,659  38,460  2  30,784  0  25,557 
9  4  7  10  0,145  0,089  0,252  0,394  0,082  0,670  0,751  5  1  4  3  0,733  5  10  -2,368  5,021  37,743  1  37,765  2  43,684 
10  1  21  32  0,261  0,144  0,388  0,124  0,333  0,538  0,782  8  2  20  11  0,737          43,239  1  35,459  1  34,106 
10  1  44  50  0,261  0,144  0,388  0,124  0,333  0,538  0,782  8  2  41  6  0,737          43,239  1  35,459  1  34,106 
...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
 
Equivalence between statistical abbreviations (SPSS) and model variables 
SPSS  Model    SPSS  Model 
SIM  Number of simulation    VST  Speed (v
jST )* 
ID_ST   Identifier of standard technology     DST   Duration (d
jST
) 
TST   Standard emergence (
ST
0 t )    PST  Depth ( p
jST
) 
TFST   Standard end    ID_CHT  Identifier of challenging technology 
CA01  Starting level of performance of
jST T in criteria 1 (
0 ,1
jST
Ak Ck = )    TRP  Replacement time (  rp t ) 
CA02  ditto  2 k =     SCS  Susceptibility to changes in supply (dco
jST
)* 
CA03  ditto  3 k =     SCD  Susceptibility to changes in demand (dcd
jST
)* 
CA04  ditto  4 k =     CED  Cumulative environmental damage without the intervention of the Agency  (ced ) 
CA05  ditto  5 k =     F_ICED  Frequency of irreversible damage without the Agency 
FIT_ST   Actual fitness (
j
t F ) of the technology standard at the time 
ST
0 t     CEDA  Cumulative environmental damage with the intervention of the Agency  (ceda ) 
FIT_BAT  ditto of the BAT  at the time 
ST
0 t     F_ICEDA  Frequency of irreversible damage with the Agency 
ID_BAT  Identifier of best alternative technology    AC_SU  Accumulated support ( ,
j
t t j D" ￿ ) at the end of simulation 
FST   Frequency ( f
ST
)    * Note: higher numbers indicate lower levels 




Appendix 3. Data for the first standard recorded in each simulation, filtered out from the general results of the 150 simulations 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22 
SIM  ID_ST  TST  TFST  FIT_ST  FIT_BAT  ID_BAT  FST_FB1  FST  VST  DST  PST  ID_CHT  TRP  SCS  SCD  CED  F_ICED  CEDA  CED_CEDA  F_ICEDA  AC_SU 
3  2  2  11  0,722  0,674  3  0  3  1  9  0,847  9  12  -2,425  6,722  33,829  0  33,406  1  1  35,436 
4  3  4  10  0,746  0,723  5  0  2  3  6  0,667  12  9  1,980  4,213  37,247  1  35,617  1  0  32,484 
7  13  15  18  0,579  0,699  2  1  1  4  3  0,667  20  24  56,295  6,936  37,010  2  27,140  1  0  23,272 
8  2  2  6  0,766  0,731  4  0  1  1  4  0,907  6  5  -5,472  2,659  38,460  2  30,784  1  0  25,557 
9  4  7  10  0,670  0,751  5  1  1  4  3  0,733  5  10  -2,368  5,021  37,743  1  37,765  0  2  43,684 
14  3  1  10  0,557  0,464  2  0  1  0  9  0,862  7  11  49,904  7,169  38,682  2  35,819  1  0  35,215 
15  2  4  7  0,787  0,786  3  0  2  3  3  0,563  3  6  2,374  7,302  36,528  1  18,919  1  0  20,994 
16  2  6  10  0,698  0,684  8  0  3  4  4  0,616  12  10  60,655  4,035  40,204  1  31,362  1  0  25,781 
18  1  4  8  0,576  0,685  2  1  3  3  4  1,000  2  7  46,575  4,162  40,782  2  30,661  1  1  29,659 
20  2  4  10  0,607  0,626  5  1  2  3  6  0,667  7  9  -3,865  2,202  41,211  2  48,123  0  1  47,674 
22  4  5  12  0,717  0,616  5  0  1  3  7  0,925  13  13  69,454  2,959  39,304  1  39,093  1  2  43,622 
25  3  9  12  0,635  0,721  7  1  2  7  3  0,638  10  12  -2,188  5,854  38,240  1  32,766  1  0  27,082 
26  3  4  19  0,747  0,725  6  0  1  3  15  0,922  22  19  17,263  3,743  40,424  2  41,261  0  2  41,763 
30  3  4  9  0,726  0,761  9  1  1  3  5  0,837  16  9  19,336  2,321  39,226  1  34,780  1  1  32,567 
31  4  5  15  0,717  0,687  6  0  1  3  10  0,871  13  15  39,368  0,436  40,309  1  24,560  1  0  25,570 
32  4  10  13  0,668  0,719  6  1  5  4  3  0,679  14  13  5,282  6,904  44,828  1  38,321  1  1  35,476 
32  14  16  19  0,663  0,773  19  1  5  5  3  0,727  1  19  5,282  1,538  44,828  1  38,321  1  1  35,476 
34  2  3  9  0,695  0,588  5  0  2  2  6  0,837  9  8  87,255  0,919  34,590  1  35,638  0  1  38,840 
35  2  3  8  0,679  0,724  3  1  4  2  5  0,807  3  7  6,848  1,321  40,042  2  36,452  1  0  36,046 
36  2  5  11  0,701  0,761  4  1  2  3  6  0,818  5  10  12,775  2,789  40,261  2  31,181  1  0  23,790 
41  2  4  14  0,748  0,654  1  0  2  3  10  0,976  9  13  11,420  2,365  31,783  2  24,354  1  0  25,012 
45  3  4  9  0,704  0,649  5  0  1  3  5  0,898  6  8  51,055  0,210  38,038  1  37,479  1  0  42,270 
46  2  4  9  0,626  0,531  1  0  3  3  5  0,929  3  8  20,278  1,638  40,530  1  38,555  1  1  40,033 
49  4  4  9  0,447  0,635  2  1  4  3  5  0,923  8  8  41,994  1,955  39,540  1  33,467  1  0  29,418 
52  8  8  11  0,698  0,833  10  1  1  4  3  0,701  12  11  61,404  2,419  36,044  0  36,484  0  0  35,546 
53  3  7  11  0,813  0,670  5  0  2  4  4  0,797  10  10  20,627  0,098  38,085  2  30,067  1  0  28,275 
54  3  1  6  0,608  0,539  2  0  2  0  5  0,735  4  5  21,849  6,746  36,964  1  28,536  1  0  23,245 
55  2  3  9  0,660  0,662  3  1  2  2  6  0,814  9  8  -19,459  2,747  37,020  0  33,188  1  0  32,249 
58  9  8  12  0,672  0,691  11  1  1  4  4  0,737  12  12  26,455  0,806  37,226  2  36,403  1  1  35,919 
60  2  5  16  0,786  0,754  3  0  1  3  11  0,905  13  17  5,424  1,533  35,341  1  30,345  1  0  28,980 
62  4  7  12  0,622  0,547  3  0  1  5  5  0,659  8  12  0,819  4,425  39,429  2  47,526  0  1  47,674 
65  4  3  6  0,628  0,677  2  1  2  2  3  0,617  6  7  6,033  3,715  30,669  0  33,426  0  0  27,494 
66  2  4  7  0,846  0,786  3  0  3  3  3  0,986  4  6  13,720  0,602  33,503  1  32,400  1  1  33,068 
68  3  15  22  0,651  0,682  16  1  1  11  7  0,847  21  21  12,689  4,994  37,679  2  33,150  1  0  25,969 
 
 




SIM  ID_ST  TST  TFST  FIT_ST  FIT_BAT  ID_BAT  FST_FB1  FST  VST  DST  PST  ID_CHT  TRP  SCS  SCD  CED  F_ICED  CEDA  CED_CEDA  F_ICEDA  AC_SU 
 
70  4  6  10  0,680  0,622  5  0  3  3  4  0,752  10  10  46,450  6,625  36,985  2  20,960  1  0  20,722 
71  2  10  28  0,554  0,738  6  1  2  9  18  0,656  24  31  -23,571  2,387  41,201  1  35,088  1  1  33,136 
72  2  4  11  0,657  0,695  4  1  2  3  7  0,928  6  10  40,860  2,030  38,938  2  34,848  1  1  32,102 
74  2  4  13  0,751  0,641  4  0  2  3  9  0,945  7  13  8,857  5,524  33,946  1  34,427  0  0  33,062 
75  3  4  11  0,819  0,764  6  0  2  3  7  0,917  13  10  130,657  3,408  36,892  1  27,291  1  0  23,025 
76  3  3  7  0,566  0,522  1  0  1  2  4  0,574  6  7  -17,671  0,363  36,840  2  42,174  0  2  47,702 
77  2  3  6  0,630  0,828  4  1  2  2  3  0,667  4  6  16,443  0,970  38,320  1  35,658  1  0  34,150 
81  2  8  11  0,648  0,697  8  1  1  6  3  0,568  3  10  -8,824  8,004  42,270  1  37,106  1  1  37,074 
85  1  4  8  0,623  0,537  2  0  2  3  4  0,745  4  7  5,982  2,645  46,149  1  25,454  1  0  23,231 
87  2  4  15  0,655  0,489  1  0  2  2  11  0,883  8  15  10,751  3,546  41,896  2  37,013  1  1  40,176 
88  5  7  10  0,657  0,682  3  1  1  6  3  0,853  8  10  4,455  5,038  34,947  0  29,650  1  0  28,623 
90  2  2  25  0,753  0,735  1  0  2  1  23  0,647  1  25  -4,323  8,656  18,962  0  13,954  1  0  18,144 
99  3  3  8  0,815  0,683  5  0  1  2  5  0,826  6  8  109,492  3,465  38,655  1  35,556  1  1  39,796 
100  2  3  7  0,658  0,641  1  0  1  2  4  0,914  4  7  107,583  5,249  39,072  1  33,678  1  0  32,002 
101  1  4  8  0,581  0,624  2  1  3  3  4  0,897  2  7  -0,567  1,866  33,853  1  35,509  0  0  33,056 
102  2  4  11  0,736  0,745  3  1  1  3  7  0,928  8  12  84,478  0,966  37,641  1  36,122  1  1  35,220 
105  4  8  12  0,734  0,741  9  1  1  4  4  0,699  12  12  31,504  3,319  34,555  0  22,429  1  0  21,606 
106  1  4  7  0,680  0,752  2  1  2  3  3  0,833  2  6  2,380  2,418  49,164  1  49,103  1  1  47,674 
109  9  10  13  0,580  0,622  4  1  1  4  3  0,707  11  13  46,684  2,310  36,787  1  33,037  1  0  24,031 
114  11  10  13  0,638  0,735  10  1  1  4  3  0,575  16  19  -19,264  0,083  37,357  1  31,977  1  0  30,478 
115  3  6  12  0,717  0,830  5  1  2  4  6  0,910  11  11  30,238  3,597  39,118  2  36,401  1  1  35,245 
120  3  4  19  0,747  0,725  6  0  1  3  15  0,922  22  19  17,263  3,743  40,424  2  41,261  0  2  41,763 
121  5  7  10  0,619  0,733  7  1  1  6  3  0,600  7  9  4,143  3,941  40,214  2  39,526  1  2  42,797 
126  4  4  8  0,638  0,612  3  0  2  3  4  0,671  8  8  66,036  1,554  37,898  0  32,397  1  1  37,624 
128  2  4  10  0,702  0,664  5  0  2  3  6  0,813  11  9  28,221  1,091  39,077  1  35,161  1  1  28,866 
132  2  5  9  0,771  0,631  7  0  2  4  4  0,789  11  10  58,527  4,515  36,245  1  29,796  1  0  26,141 
133  1  4  7  0,559  0,668  2  1  3  3  3  1,000  2  6  22,446  0,380  35,705  2  38,805  0  1  37,246 
136  3  7  10  0,751  0,782  2  1  2  4  3  0,750  1  9  8,860  4,980  22,524  0  22,954  0  0  22,735 
137  2  2  8  0,687  0,694  3  1  2  1  6  0,831  7  8  -7,965  2,964  41,250  2  31,725  1  0  33,407 
140  2  5  10  0,676  0,733  5  1  1  4  5  0,679  4  10  69,611  8,182  36,446  2  27,215  1  0  25,174 
141  2  7  11  0,756  0,669  3  0  2  6  4  0,753  3  11  35,131  1,998  32,478  1  31,667  1  0  27,800 
142  3  5  8  0,756  0,743  7  0  3  4  3  0,651  6  7  3,273  0,394  31,298  0  29,268  1  0  24,248 
144  1  4  8  0,590  0,921  5  1  1  3  4  0,844  2  26  -1,299  1,951  47,601  1  41,665  1  2  45,712 
146  3  5  14  0,716  0,734  5  1  2  3  9  0,875  12  13  67,962  1,493  41,272  2  37,329  1  1  39,801 
147  2  4  10  0,730  0,568  3  0  2  2  6  0,966  7  10  74,271  2,691  37,160  1  28,970  1  0  26,026 
148  1  3  6  0,592  0,557  2  0  2  2  3  0,582  5  7  0,580  6,149  43,800  1  31,787  1  0  27,053 
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Typical results of the model (base scenario)   RAM technologies (Nadejda y Ausubel, 2002) 
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